the Burger Court. Many critics who had no political axes to grind were uneasy about the Warren Court's techniques. Professors Alexander M. Bickel and Harry Wellington were disturbed by instances "of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results .accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they cite and the results they decree." ' Outside academic circles, most Americans might not lose much sleep over the niceties of legal craftmanship and judicial reasoning. But people did care about how the Court's opinions might affect their lives. In the 1968 presidential race, Richard M. Nixon capitalized on these concerns. Appealing to "law and order" sentiments, Nixon complained that the justices were weakening the country's "peace forces" and giving too much ground to the "criminal forces." The first civil right of every American, he declared, "is to be free from domestic violence." ' During his first term as president, Nixon put four justices on the Court. Rarely has a president been given the opportunity to fill so many vacancies in so short a time. Moreover, one would search the history books in vain to find a president who was more explicit in the political philosophy which inspired his appointments. In nominating Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist (filling the third and fourth vacancies), Nixon recalled his campaign pledge "to nominate to the Supreme Court individuals who shared my judicial philosophy, which is basically a conservative philosophy."' 0 For journalists and other Court watchers, the changing of the guard carried all the elements of high drama. Pundits quickly coined the name, "the Nixon Court." In November 1971, U.S. News and World Report concluded that if the Powell and Rehnquist nominations were approved, "it will be a Nixon Court, dominated by conservatives."'" With the departures of some of the great names of the Warren years, notably Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan, predictions for the future were often bleak. Some observers foretold the emergence of a Nixon bloc on the Court, marching in lockstep to undo the work of the Warren Court. Reviewing the 1971 Term, The New Republic lamented that the "single-mindedness of the Nixon team threatens the image of the Court as an independent institution."'"
A new Supreme Court justice generally goes through a settling-in period, which may last several years. Usually, one cannot predict from a justice's first 8 Term what his record is likely to be as he becomes more at home on the Court. Nevertheless, from the start of the Burger Court there was evidence that, with the four Nixon appointees on the bench, a new majority was in the making. By the end of the 1975 Term, the Burger Court seemed to have come of age. The closing days of that Term were busy. The cases decided in the final week reveal the strength of the new tides that were running in the affairs of the Court. For the first time in forty years, the Court struck down a federal statute on the ground that Congress had exceeded its commerce powers-a startling decision to a generation of law professors accustomed to teaching their students that the tenth amendment was a historical curiosity and that the commerce clause seemed to know no bounds. 13 Contrasts with the Warren Court abounded in the decisions of those closing days of the 1975 Term. Continuing a process already underway, the justices whittled away at the rights of criminal defendants, showing particular disfavor for fourth amendment claims. In addition to deciding several cases curtailing the reach of that amendment, the Court closed the doors of federal courts to large numbers of petitioners by holding that a state prisoner who has had a full and fair opportunity to raise a fourth amendment question in the state courts cannot relitigate that question in federal habeas corpus. 4 The contrasts with the sixties embraced equal protection-a favorite of the Warren era. In one of a number of Burger Court opinions drawing the line on the so-called "new" equal protection, the Court, upholding a statute mandating retirement at age fifty for state police officers, ruled that age is not a "suspect" classification and therefore that claims of age discrimination do not require that the state law be subject to strict scrutiny. It was enough that the statute satisfy the far less demanding standard of minimum rationality.
1 " Procedural due process, another growth sector in the Warren years, also fared poorly, as the justices limited the opportunity for prison inmates to object to their transfer to other prisons. 16 Another decision at the close of the Term touched sensitive moral nerves; the Court rejected the argument that capital punishment is inherently unconstitutional. 20 Where the Warren justices were suspicious of government power, the Burger Court was showing a willingness to trust the system, to assume that police officers and other officials generally try to observe constitutional limitations in performing their duties. 2 ' Miranda and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule were under fire although neither had been overruled. 22 In general, the Burger Court appeared to be less willing to supersede the political process in solving social problems. Sensitive to the concerns such as those of Felix Frankfurter about limits on the competence of judges, justices of the Burger era were openly worrying about how far judges., ought to go in second-guessing legislative judgments about issues like the death penalty or in taking over the administration of nonjudicial functions such as public education.
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As of the summer of 1976 a Burger Court observer might conclude, therefore, that the era of the Warren Court had drawn to a close, and that another, more conservative, less activist Court had taken its place. Yet he would be surprised if he tested his conclusions against the record the Court began to compile in the succeeding Terms. By the close of the seventies, it had become clear that alongside the trends already described, other forces were at work-forces having their roots in the activism of the Warren years. it had become far more difficult to draw clean distinctions between the years of Earl Warren and those of Warren Burger.
Capital punishment cases furnish one example. Some might read the 1976 decision refusing to outlaw the death penalty altogether as evidence of a permissive attitude toward state legislation and perhaps as reflecting a law and order mentality. Yet after 1976 the Court continued, as it had done in previous terms, to place sharp limits on the power of states to impose capital punishment. In June 1977, the justices decided two such cases. In one they invalidated a state law making the death penalty mandatory for the murder of a policeman on duty, and in the other they held capital punishment to be disproportionate as the penalty for rape. 24 The Court has regulated quite closely the procedures by which the death penalty is imposed, striking down a number of statutes in this way. 25 Moreover, the Court has, with the rape case, begun to look at the intrinsic question, no matter how fastidious the procedure, when is death beyond the state's substantive power to impose. 26 When one studies the actual opinions in the death penalty cases, one discovers, whatever the label, a close scrutiny of the verdict of death. These are not cases in which the justices relax in the face of the exercise of state police power. A state may have, in light of the 1976 decision, the theoretical power to take away a defendant's life, but in practice the state has to run a tight gantlet to satisfy the Court. One is reminded of "strict scrutiny" of a kind commonly associated with the Warren Court's approach to equal protection. Once again the talisman of "no legitimate expectation of privacy" was used to limit the reach of the fourth amendment-this time in a holding that the installation of a pen register to record the telephone numbers one has dialed does not constitute a fourth amendment search.
2 Editors and reporters, increasingly nervous about the high court's press rulings, largely were horrified by the Court's 1979 ruling in Gannett that the sixth amendment's "public trial" guarantee does not mean what the press thought it meant, and by the decision in Herbert v. Lando that a libel plaintiff could use pretrial discovery to enquire into a television producer's thoughts and opinions formed during the editorial process. Women's groups were outraged when the Court upheld a Massachusetts veterans preference law which gives absolute preference to veterans in state hiring-in a state where fewer than 2 percent of veterans are women. 4 And in a series of procedural due process holdings, the Court showed itself unfavorably disposed to requiring more formal procedures in a variety of settings, ranging from parole hearings to the voluntary commitment of minors. '36 A few months later, an article in The New York Times Magazine painted a different picture: the Burger Court, it was charged, "has changed little from its early days" when the Court was generally viewed as a "conservative bench bent on substantially altering the constitutional jurisprudence on the Warren Court. 3 7 With Warren Burger now into his second decade as Chief Justice, there are many ways in which one might try to take the measure of the Court's record in the post-Warren era. One way would be to assess the Burger Court in terms of the expectations aroused in the early seventies when Nixon appointees were taking their seats on the bench. Partly because Nixon aroused such strong passions, observers were bold to make predictions about the sort of place the Court would become when the new justices made their presence felt. Nixon has come and gone, but there is no doubt that his legacy lingers longest in the judicial branch, both in the Supreme Court and in the vast number of federal judges whom he appointed to the lower bench. On the high court, the new directions in judicial doctrine made possible by Nixon's appointees are most visible in criminal justice decisions. The impulses that gave birth in the sixties to Mapp's exclusionary rule, to the Miranda decision, and to other decisions helpful to criminal defendants have been muted. Although the Warren Court's leading criminal justice decisions have not been overturned, they have often been limited or qualified. As Nixon's attacks on the Warren Court were concerned above all with its criminal justice decisions, the trends of the seventies confirm the impact of his appointments.
If, however, by predicting the emergence of a "Nixon Court," the Courtwatcher of the early seventies supposed that across the board the Court's decisions were likely to reflect Nixonian preferences, that notion was a myth from 4 and, of course, requiring Nixon to hand over the Watergate tapes-a decision which carried the name of Nixon's own appointee as Chief Justice and agreed to by his other three nominees. 45 One of the happy lessons gleaned from the record of the Burger Court is that while presidents can, in general terms, affect the direction of the Court, the justices operate with a historic sense of purpose quite free of any feeling of indebtedness to the political forces which may have put them in black robes in the first place. Indeed, to the discomfort of presidents from Jefferson to Nixon, the justices advance with fierce pride the claim first fashioned by John Marshall: that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" 
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B. The Burger Court versus the Warren Court
Another concern some observers voiced, as the Burger Court came into being, was that it would overturn much of the legacy of the Warren Court. If the respective Courts' animating spirits be the test, there is much to distinguish the two eras, for example, a distinct disenchantment in the seventies with the headlong egalitarianism manifest in some of the Warren Court opinions. As a result, the Burger Court has often limited or qualified what it inherited from its predecessor. Here and there one finds direct overruling. In a series of cases raising the issue of the application of the first amendment to picketing and handbilling in privately-owned shopping centers, in 1972 the Court lamely sought to distinguish a 1968 precedent preferring the rights of expression to the property rights of the owners of the shopping center. 48 In 1976 the justices went all the way and concluded that the earlier decision had not survived. 49 50 There have also been instances of the Burger Court overruling pre-Warren Court decisions. For the most part, however, the Burger Court prefers to limit or distinguish a precedent, including even those Warren Court decisions found somewhat distasteful. Often the Burger Court will leave the precedent as is but refuse to carry its inherent logic to the next step. Thus, while Miranda has not been overruled-and is not likely to be-the Court has held that statements otherwise inadmissible under Miranda may nonetheless be admitted to impeach the defendant's testimony should he take the stand. 5 2 Likewise, rather than overturn the Warren Court's 1967 holding that a suspect is entitled to the presence of counsel at a pretrial police lineup, in a 1972 decision the Burger Court seized upon the fact that the earlier ruling had involved a postindictment lineup. Showing itself to be a master of the fine line, the Court in the later case refused to apply the requirement of counsel to a situation where a lineup had been conducted before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise formally charged. 5 3 Significantly, the large body of the Warren Court's work is securely in place. [Vol. 43: No. 3 the fourteenth amendment-remain. In school cases, the Burger Court has rebuffed the efforts of lower courts to provide remedies for de facto segregation or to require otherwise unoffending suburban school districts to share the burden of desegregating the central city. 54 Yet where de jure segregation is proved, the Burger Court has been altogether supportive of federal judges' power to fashion effective remedies. 55 In legislative reapportionment cases, the Burger Court has permitted a measure of deviation from mathematical equality in state legislative districting, but the essential requirement remains that representation must be based on population.
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In cases involving "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, Justice Powell, in the spirit of the late Justice Harlan, has argued that due process does not require that all the judicial gloss surrounding a federal guarantee, such as jury trial, necessarily apply in a state proceeding. 5 7 So far, at least, he has failed to convince a majority of his colleagues to endorse his view. 5 " It is a striking testimonial to the way in which innovations become accepted doctrine that the ridicule which Justice Frankfurter heaped upon "incorporation" so recently as 194759 and the even more recent efforts of Justice Harlan 60 have not persuaded a Court which cares about federalism (and about punishing crime) to allow the states freer rein in criminal procedure cases. And it is part of the evidence that, while the justices of the seventies may have rearranged much of the furniture, they have not set about redesigning the basic structure inherited from the Warren Court.
C. Judicial Activism As of the early seventies, one might well have predicted that the Burger Court would not be an "activist" tribunal-that it would be deferential to legislative judgments and to the political process. Activism and a proclivity to play policy maker had been, after all, among the hallmarks of the Warren Court, and Richard Nixon seemed bent on seeing the Court foreswear such bad habits. Moreover, there was evidence that his nominees understood the In the opinions of the Burger Court, there is evidence of a preference, by at least some of the justices, for leaving difficult social issues to the political process. In rejecting an attack on the Texas system of financing public schools through heavy reliance on local property taxes, Justice Powell pointed to state decisions about raising and disbursing tax revenues as an area in which the Court "has traditionally deferred to state legislatures." Moreover, Powell argued against judges, ill informed in education matters, being too ready to interfere with "the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. '62 In the capital punishment cases, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist saw a fundamental issue as being the presumption that in a democratic society courts ought to be slow to strike down legislative judgments. 63 In a third area, sex discrimination, four justices, in an opinion by Justice Powell, pointed to the country's being in the process of considering the Equal Rights Amendment as a reason for not going along with Justice Brennan's argument that gender classifications, like those based on race, should be inherently suspect and thus give rise to strict scrutiny. 64 Yet, while the Court may have its apostles of restraint, evidence of activism is legion. Roe v. Wade, holding that liberty as protected by due process of law includes a woman's right to abortion, is surely a paradigm example. 65 If activism means to formulate a right not explicitly nor impliedly given constitutional status, it would be hard to find a more activist opinion than Roe. Its author, of course, was one of the Nixon appointees, Justice Blackmun. Roe v. Wade is no sport. In the seventies substantive due process, that habit many folks thought judges had kicked after 1937, became respectable again. Even in the Warren years, suggestions that a decision might turn on substantive due process were embarassing to the justices. This unease goes a long way toward explaining Justice Douglas's remarkable "emanations from a penum- He was mistaken-at least in noneconomic cases. 68 Griswold was simply oldfashioned substantive due process. So was Roe v. Wade, as Justice Stewart, a dissenter in Griswold but with the majority in Roe, conceded. 6 9 Justice Powell cast his lot openly with the legitimacy of substantive due process in his opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland, where he extended strict scrutiny to a local ordinance impinging on the "extended family." Powell sought to make the use of substantive due process appear less free-wheeling by offering the "teachings of history" and the "basic values that underlie our society" as guides. 70 Such arguments, when made by Justice Frankfurter, had never comforted Justice Black, 7 1 but Black's unbending opposition to substantive due process has not carried the day. It is interesting that, where the Warren Court had skirted the technique with evident discomfort, the Burger Court has openly reestablished substantive due process as a means available to limit governmental power. 72 Other examples could be supplied. The general conclusion, however, is clear-the Burger Court is no more a stranger to judicial activism than was the Warren Court. A majority of the post-Warren justices may from time to time, as in Rodriguez, forebear to use the judicial tools available to them, but they have proved in other cases, for example, in Roe, their willingness to use those tools when the occasion seems inviting.
D. The Court's Business
Recalling how the Warren Court was criticized for finding so many new things for judges to do, one might have supposed that the Burger Court would find ways to constrict the breadth and scope of the Court's business-a variation on the expectation that the Court in the seventies would be less activist. Certainly justices who worry about whether judges have the expertise to run school systems or oversee other public activities might be expected to try to narrow the categories of cases which will find their way to the Court's docket.
There are essentially two ways in which the Court can stay out of areas with which it would rather not deal. One is the use of avoidance techniques such as ripeness and mootness: devices which can be used to get rid of a particular case at bar. The other is to use denials of review, or perhaps summary affirmances, to make it clear that the Court simply has no interest in a given class of cases.
The Burger Court has found a number of ways to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to get into federal courts in the first instance. The justices have tightened the screws in some (but not all) standing rulings, 73 thrown up obstacles to class action suits, 74 created financial barriers by being unsympathetic to efforts to imply a basis for award of attorneys fees from federal statutes, 75 sharply curtailed opportunities for state criminal defendants to seek federal habeas corpus, 76 and curbed federal court injunctions against state judicial proceedings.
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Once cases reach the Supreme Court, however, justices of the Burger era appear to have been as inconsistent as their predecessors in using avoidance techniques to circumvent ruling on the merits of a case on the docket. In DeFunis, for example, the Court held the case moot because Marco Defunis was in his final semester in law school and seemed certain to graduate. Thus, with the country poised expectantly for a judicial guidepost to the explosive issue of racial preferences in higher education, the Court ducked. Yet, in Roe v. Wade, where by the time the case was heard by the Supreme Court Ms. Roe had obviously either had a baby or an abortion, the Court slid easily by the mootness issue, invoking the familiar "capable of repetition, yet evading review" formula. 79 Avoidance techniques aside, the Court may show its lack of interest in a category of cases through the Court's pattern of granting and denying review. The justices have been pointedly selective in determining which kinds of "personal autonomy" cases they will take. Operating from the doctrinal base of Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, the Court has woven a web of protection around a cluster of intimate sexual and familial decisions-to marry, to beget (or not) a child, to have an abortion, or to divorce.
8 " Yet the justices show no interest in other claims raised in the name of "autonomy," for example, school dress code and hair cases. Each of ten judicial circuits has decided school hair cases, and they have divided five-to-five. 8 ' Despite this classic conflict of circuits, the Court has never heard a school hair case, 82 nor is it likely to do so. The justices seem to agree with Justice Black's "don't bother us with this nonsense" view (expressed in an order denying a stay): "Surely few policies can be thought of that states are more capable of deciding than the length of the hair of schoolboys. ' "83 Nor, despite all the popular attention to "gay rights," do the justices appear to have much interest in claims that sexual preferences ought to receive constitutional protection. When a three-judge federal court in Virginia divided two-to-one in rejecting male homosexuals' challenge to that state's sodomy law, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. The Court neither heard argument nor gave reasons for its decision. 8 4 Other efforts to attract the Court's attention to homosexuality cases-for example, cases in which teachers sought to prevent being fired because of their sexual preferences-have failed .
5
Looking at the Burger Court's record overall, however, one is struck more by the new ground it has ploughed than by the terrain it has chosen to ignore. Areas that were rare or untouched in the Warren years have become a staple of the Court's docket. In the sixties Justice Goldberg sought in vain to bring up the issue of capital punishment; the Court would not even grant cer-tiorari. 8 6 Not only did the Burger Court, in Furman v. Georgia, decide that capital statutes as then administered were unconstitutional; it has continued to decide death penalty cases with regularity.
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Sex discrimination cases have been even more regular fare on the Court's table. In 1961, the Warren Court easily turned aside constitutional challenges to a Florida law making jury services for women completely voluntary. 8 Since that time, the women's movement has become one of the visible facts of the American scene, and Term after Term the Burger Court has decided a stream of sex discrimination cases. Sometimes the challenged law is sustained, more often it is not. The justices have differed on standards, settling in effect for a kind of intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Yet whatever the test, and whatever the result, the simple fact is that sex discrimination cases-not to mention other cases involving women's rights (such as the abortion cases)-occupy a major part of the Court's attention.
9
What we are witnessing is the "judicialization" or "constitutionalization" of American life. What blacks accomplished by going to court in the days of the Civil Rights movement inspired others to emulate their example. Prisoners, voters victimized by malapportionment, women, juveniles, inmates of mental institutions-virtually any group or individual failing to get results from the legislative process or from administrators has turned to the courts for relief. Emboldened by experience in desegregating schools and reapportioning legislatures, federal judges (led by such jurists as Frank Johnson and Skelly Wright) began to weave remedies for a variety of ills.
The Burger Court might have been expected to call "halt" to the process of constitutionalization. In some areas, the justices have sought to slow the process. Rodriguez represents a victory for a hands-off approach to school finance, and Rizzo v. Goode reflects deep doubts about letting judges in effect lay down operational rules for police departments.
9 " But such decisions seem to be only moments for catching breath in the expansion of areas in which the judiciary is willing to enquire. The Burger Court may sometimes reach a "liberal" result, sometimes a "conservative" one. It may sometimes lay a restraining hand on federal judges, sometimes be more permissive. All the while, however, the scope of the Supreme Court's docket expands to include wider terrain. In constitutional litigation, there appears to be a kind of rachet effect: once courts get into an area, they rarely depart. Neither does the Su- Many of the expectations harbored at the outset of the Burger Court-that it would be a Nixon Court, that it would undo much of the Warren Court's work, that it would draw back from judicial activism, that it would constrict the scope and breadth of the Court's business-simply have not become reality. Still other predictions could be examined, and they, too, would likely have to be, at the least, revised or heavily qualified. For example, surely, it was thought, the Burger Court would be a "law and order" court. To be sure, this Court is more sensitive to the needs of law enforcement than was the Warren Court. There is ample evidence of shifts in many dimensions of criminal justice, notably interrogations and search and seizure law.
92 Yet conclusions about "law and order" mentality would have to be qualified by noting such decisions as that extending the Gideon right-to-counsel principle to misdemeanor cases, and the Court's emphatic reaffirmation of the centrality of the warrant requirement in fourth amendment cases, surprising those observers who thought the Court would somehow slide to a reasonableness standard.
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Yet another surmise was that the Burger Court would be a "states' rights" court, a tribunal which would revive federalism. The best evidence bearing out such an expectation, of course, is National League of Cities v. Usery, a decision resting squarely on assumptions about state sovereignty. 94 There are, as well, decisions in which federalism, or the related value of localism, is at least one of the articulated interests. 95 But save in the rare case like National League of Cities, references to federalism are commonly mixed with other values, such as a concern about economy of judicial effort or about finality of litigation. 9 6 X More to the point, there is ample evidence that, when it comes to umpiring the federal system, the Burger Court does not tilt toward the states and away from federal power. In general there appears to be no tendency to deny to Congress powers to deal with national problems, however local the 91. On the policy-making role of the courts, see D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POL-ICY (1977 In short, one should be slow to put labels on the Burger Court. It remains to enquire, then, what accounts for the Burger Court's mixed record-for the ad hoc, episodic quality of the Court's opinions.
The temperament and habits of the justices play a part. It is easy to imagine justices coming to the conference table with "shopping lists," justices who look over the Court's conference lists with an eye to cases that could become vehicles for doctrinal initiatives. Some observers no doubt see Justice Rehnquist as such an ideologue.
1 00 For the most part, however, this is not an accurate picture of how the justices of this Court do their work. Overall, the present Court is one whose members take the cases as they come. The very fact that the Court must await a "case" or "controversy" is, of course, a force that tends to make the Court reactive rather than initiative. It is likely in any event that the Burger Court justices, by comparison to some of their recent predecessors, find themselves more comfortable working case by case rather than by broad directions.
This tendency is reinforced by the Court's workload pressures. More than one justice, the Chief Justice included, has complained about the burdens thus placed on the Court. Through their fully evolved doctrines, they put pressure on their colleagues to think about cases in doctrinal terms. Even Earl Warren, in some senses so unscholarly, put an ethical pressure on his brethren, as in facing the issue of racial segregation in the public schools. Sometimes (as with Frankfurter) the emphasis was on process, sometimes (as with Douglas) on result. 104 In either event, issues had a way of emerging as preordained. In judging, as in politics, ideology has a way of making questions seem clearer and their answers more foretold.' 0 5 Since the departure of the great ideologues, the justices are under less pressure to fit individual cases into doctrinal tableaux. No longer preordained, issues are seen to be more complex. Ad hoc results become the order of the day-a natural consequence when problems refuse to be contained in the jacket of doctrinal order. Justice Powell came to the Court inclined to thinking in the pragmatic way of the practicing lawyer, rather than in abstract doctrine.
1 0 6 As a justice he has come to be identified with "balancing." Justice Black's critics used to scorn him as an "absolutist" (he wore the badge proudly); no one would be likely to hang that label on Justice Powell." 0 7 Likewise, Justice Stewart is more comfortable with ad hoc judging than with theory. It is no accident that Powell and Stewart are identified with the centrists on the Court who collectively hold the balance of power in most cases. All in all, one can argue that the Burger Court is, surprisingly enough, a less ideological bench than was the Warren Court.
The justices' tendency to ad hoc decisions is reflected in the distaste some of them show for categorical, per se rules. The Warren Court's fondness for prophylactic rules, such as Miranda or the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, is not echoed in the Burger Court. This Court may not have gone so far as to jettison those prophylactic rules, but the justices leave little doubt that they are more comfortable with fact oriented adjudication than with broader formulations. 104 . On Justice Frankfurter's concern with process, see the paper he read at a meeting of the American Philosophical Society in 1954, published in 98 PROCEEDINGS OF AMER. PHIL. Soc'v 223 (1954 The Burger Court has for some time been characterized by a lack of cohesive voting blocs. On one side are the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist; on the other, Justices Brennan and Marshall. Between these wings is a floating middle group. Justice Stevens came to the Court in 1975, and commentators are still trying to label him (the fact that he is often called the Court's "wild card" reflects the pundits' inability to do any better). Stewart and White remain essentially centrists, Powell is ever the careful (and moderate) craftsman. As for Blackmun, it has been a long time since anyone has talked about the "Minnesota Twins." Evidence of the Court's fragmentation may be gleaned from a look at the voting pattern of the four Nixon appointees. In the 1973 Term, they voted together in over three-fourths of all decided cases, in the 1975 Term nearly as often, but by the 1977 Term they agreed in only about half of the cases decided. 108 In addition to the inner dynamics of the Court, the nature of the issues before the Burger Court help to account for the mixed character of the Court's record. The Warren Court is well remembered for decisions laying down general principles: Brown, Mapp, Miranda, and Reynolds v. Sims are typical Warren Court decisions; all of them paint in broad strokes. Reynolds reads more like an essay in political theory than a judicial opinion.
10 9 The Warren Court was sometimes more comfortable making policy on the grand level than implementing it. Thus, it was more than a decade after Brown before the Warren Court began to attend seriously to the need to oversee the work of the lower courts in desegregation cases. Moreover, many of the major Warren Court decisions date from the later years of that Court, the high water mark being the mid-sixties. The task of implementing much of what the Warren Court began has fallen, therefore, to the Burger Court. Implementation, by its nature, draws courts into closer judgment calls. It is the difference between writing the National Basketball Association's rulebook and, in the fast breaking action of an actual basketball game, applying those rules. Whereas the Warren Court wrote many of the rules, the Burger Court finds itself refereeing while the game continues. Had the Warren Court survived into the seventies, it might have found implementation as difficult and as splintering as has the Burger Court.
One senses that the justices of the Burger era have perceived the issues of the seventies as more complex than was true of litigation in the sixties. This Court may mirror the shift in the mood of the country at large, from the bold enthusiasm of the Kennedy years to doubt and uncertainty about solutions to social issues in the years after the Great Society, Vietnam, and Watergate.
Contrasting Brown and Bakke may be instructive. The central question in Brown, though controversial, was relatively crisp: can state-imposed segregation by race in public schools be squared with the fourteenth amendment? By contrast, the issue of affirmative action is, for most people, more clouded, and as a result persons of sensitive ethical judgment may be found on all sides of the issue. Small wonder, then, that in contrast to Brown's unanimity (which, granted, was not that easy to come by in 1954) stands the fragmentation of the Court in Bakke-six opinions covering 156 pages. Perhaps it is only viewed in retrospect, and with the country far from where it was in 1954, that Brown looks more simple than Bakke. Yet it seems relevant that after a period of bold judicial strokes, Court and country alike might find adjusting boundaries more comforable than more innovation.
An overview of the Burger Court brings one to the conclusion that this is a Court in which no one ideology or philosophy prevails on a regular basis. It is a Court in which competing forces exist side by side. Nixon's appointees have created a strong force for conservative values. Lessons learned in the sixties, however, are not quickly unlearned. Activist techniques, once employed, are available to be used again. Their use, it should be clear, is not confined to the "liberals" on the Court. The fluid voting patterns emphasize the competition between the voices of caution and the neo-Warren bent for action.
What one sees happening in the Burger Court carries echoes of the lessons of American constitutional history. There has, for example, been an interesting historical interplay between due process and equal protection. From the late nineteenth century until 1937, due process, especially in economic cases, was in the ascendancy; equal protection was quiescent. After 1937, due process had a bad connotation, at least in economic cases, but the Warren Court found new uses for equal protection. The Burger Court has put unmistakable limits on the "new" equal protection but has nursed the renaissance of substantive due process. One can mark similar rises and falls in the use of other clauses, such as the contract clause. 10 One thing that such clauses-due process, equal protection, the contract clause-have in common is that each can be the tool of an activist judiciary. Their use raises recurring questions about the proper role of the judiciary in a democracy and about the proper sources of judicial interpretation. 
